Lt Gen. Waldemar SKRZYPCZAK:

For the Land Forces, the last two years were full of new challenges and dynamic changes affected by participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The completely new dimension of these challenges has left its mark on the achievements of the Land Forces. Political decisions placed new tasks before the armed forces, taking us into a completely new dimension.

Beside changes in the theory of using subunits and in the awareness of commanders and soldiers in combat, there has been change in equipment and weaponry, determined by the enemy’s increasingly better methods of operation and the expectations of Polish soldiers. Whereas changes in combat theory, tactics and operational art are possible to achieve within a relatively short time, the problem of efficiently providing the armed forces with equipment and weaponry is still affected by bureaucratic procedures which paralyse all efforts aimed at change.

After almost two years in command of the Land Forces, I have the right to evaluate what has been achieved, and to judge what has not. Of course any evaluation or judgment is burdened with subjective and objective elements, but still gives an approximate picture of reality.

We have accomplished a great deal over the past two years, much still remains to be done, and a lot is impossible to achieve.

What has gone well?

We focused our main efforts at the Land Forces to develop combat capability using infantry subunits both in daytime and at night. The infantry’s weaponry, both personal and group weapons, has undergone and is still undergoing changes. The Beryl with instrumentation, with a holographic gun sight and all the rest, measures up not only to capabilities but also to expectations.

New rifles, new-generation night vision goggles, new bullet-proof vests and combat uniforms are indicators that place us in the group of well-equipped armed forces. A new type of group weapon, namely automatic grenade launchers, provide platoons in combat with completely new firing capacity. Our Rosomaks have done well in the Afghan version. They have convinced disbelievers, gained the trust of soldiers, and are the envy of their colleagues from other armies.

The necessity for capability to support land operations offered the chance for a new life for the Mi-24 and Mi-17 helicopters - their modernization, contrary to the opinions of many, places us in the group of reliable allies with substantial combat capacity. The interest shown in the Polish modernization of these helicopters has convinced me this was the right road to take to increase helicopter capability. Thanks to this, our pilots are trained in night-time operations on different types of helicopters, even on the Mi-2 as part of their basic training. We need to remember that it is crews from the Land Forces which take part in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another indicator of change are means of communication, both those used to communicate with every soldier in a squad and those which take advantage of the possibilities offered by satellites. The spectrum of change in this area is substantial. The use of new devices, including BSR, thermovision equipment, and battlefield radars, opens a new chapter in reconnaissance tactics. Combining the merits of identification, including imaging, with the possibility of obtaining information on the enemy in real time offers the capacity for rapid reaction and even prevention of enemy operations. These elements, together with the possibilities offered by SIGINT and HUMINT, make our capabilities more effective under conditions of dynamic operations.

One could mention more achievements serving to improve combat capability, as they have been many. However, I will leave these to the evaluation of the users, soldiers of the Land Forces serving in different operations.

One cannot ignore the things that did not work out well, even though in my view everything possible was done to achieve success.

One textbook example is the almost two years devoted to obtaining a pistol to replace the Wist which is unpopular among soldiers. The efforts to obtain tactical UAVs also have to be listed on the failure side. The lack of a universal vehicle is hindering the development of many different combat and support platforms. Despite many efforts, the development of two Land Forces programmes important from the point of view of combat capability, Krab and Loara, is still a problem. The Krab has to be adapted to fire precision ammunition. Without this capability it won’t be a gun to meet present-day challenges. Without the capacity to fire programmable ammunition, the Loara will meet the same fate. I could say much more about the failures, but my reflections are aimed rather at showing their causes. First and foremost, there is the omnipresent bureaucracy and institutional stipulations which effectively hamper progress; complicated procedures which are allegedly compatible with those of NATO but have been deformed in Polish style.

For many years the Polish armaments industry was enslaved, unappreciated, even destroyed. Today, like a phoenix from the ashes, it is coming out of a state of collapse. I make no secret of the significant role of the Land Forces in awakening the will to fight for Polish solutions. Thanks to an open attitude from both sides, Land Forces soldiers have become advisors and experts, to the benefit of both parties.

To conclude this slightly sombre evaluation, I would like to add that I believe that the coming years bode well both for Polish industry and, consequently, for the Land Forces in terms of access to the latest technologies in weaponry and equipment; this I would like to wish my soldiers and myself.

Lt Gen. Waldemar SKRZYPCZAK

Commander-in-Chief of Poland’s Land Forces