At January 2010 in OBRUM (R&D Center For Mechanical Devices) started to cut steel plates for technology demonstrator of future Polish universal tracked combat vehicle for XXI century. The vehicle is planned to roll out on Kielce Military Fair 2010 Exhibition. This is no small challenge as the sum total passed to OBRUM through target project of Ministry of Science makes only 17, 1 million PLN.

OBRUM remains (and most probably will remain after incorporation of Bumar) most experienced designer of medium and heavy armour combat platforms. It is worth to remain that Gliwice’s factory designed the project ‘Wilk’ (Wolf) that become a basis for PT-91 and its Malaysia variant, unfinished design of Goryl tank, technology demonstrator of BWP-2000 ACV with use of SUM-Kalina chassis, also the chassis and hull for Krab SP Howitzer that just enters mass production in CPW HSW (Military Production Center of Stalowa Wola Iron Works)

New Generation Vehicle

This time the stakes are running for a design of universal combat carrying platform for Polish Land Forces for XXI century. This should be vehicle of modular design to become a basis for light tank, support or reconnaissance vehicle tracked ACV, with interchangeable power packs, observation and fighting equipment. Such an idea is well placed at leading world countries (see German Puma, Scandinavian CV90 or- partially at least- Israeli Merkava).

After passing of heyday period for super – light vehicles and the American fever for armoured future vehicles (the forgotten FCS), initially of 18 ton later 20 ton combat weight (to be carried by C-130 Hercules), it is evident that the solution must be elsewhere. The Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that without solid anti-mine land vehicle (this suggests the combat weight about 30 tons) there are little chances of survival.

During designing of Polish combat vehicle of at least 33 ton combat weight and dimension making it suitable for transport by new European A400M there emerged a consortium led by OBRUM, and containing WB Electronics (systems integration, Fonet), Radmor (radios), PCO (optronics). We also know that vehicle will use Diehl track links and MTU power pack (similar to Puma), plus light 120mm gun (Swiss Ruag). Possible is also use of optional Zeiss optronics. OBRUM designers plan to equip the vehicle with defence system against bazooka warheads and ATGM. One of contemplated systems is Trophy by Raphael.

New program of Ministry of Defence

It seems, the interest in MON to OBRUMs combat platform is rising. It is possible that it will generate next new program of modernization of Armed Forces for 2009-2018- if the tempo of returning of Polish economics to normality will be kept up.

The tank is still the king of the battlefield

The tank lives already almost a century. From the combat debut over Somma in 1916 it plays a dominating role on the land battlefield both in global wars in XX century and in a myriad local conflicts from 1945 up to now. The mistaken opinion as to its twilight has been long ago taken as false, though it still is brooding between Polish politicians. And it seems the tank (changing forms) will remain an irreplaceable weapon of land warfare in XXI century.

Canadians, that seemingly said farewell to tracked armour, after Afghanistan experience quickly come back to tanks. They even created new tactics for their Leopard 2A6 and infantry, and this in due course has been followed by Americans. Right now they plan the next step- the buy of 138 well armoured and armed tracked ACV that should cooperate with Leopards (there are offered CV 90 and Puma).Australians also come back to modern tanks, choosing US Abrams from American reserves. In Latin America there started rear armour race (RAPORT WT001/2010) and the best evidence is French offer of sale of 30-40 Leclerc tanks from first production series to Columbia and Brasilia. Asiatic new-born countries create new generations of combat vehicles. Germans are thinking of building of new generation tank with light Rheinmetall 120mm gun, developing it from most expensive (about 7 million euro a piece) and most modern currently ACV-Puma. Israelis, as they always take into account the conventional armour battle against neighbours, work upon new idea of development, use and protection of tanks. Armed forces of Israel resigned already of (politically and economically supported and almost realized) stopping the Merkava development line. They just now start to equip most modern Merkava IV with Raphael Trophy protection system against arriving missiles.

In the last ten days of January 2010 in the David Institute in Haifa, this system has been successfully tested against saturation attack from multi directions by RPG warheads and ATGMs. This is the beginning only. The fresh idea is to add to every Merkava platoon one additional escort AFV equipped to protect other tanks in the platoon (also those Trophy equipped) through building something like protective curtain around the tanks group.

The most new ideas of armour in Israel, and still necessary in XXI century tanks especially for RAPORT-wto speaks gen. Avigdor Klein-one of creators of Merkava IV and NAMER ACV, one time the commander of Israeli Armoured Forces, the guest speaker on this year’s conference – Modern Technologies For Safety Of The Country And Its Borders.

Gen. Klein, born in Israel in 1955, absolved mechanical dept. Haifa Politechnical Institute (famous Technion- the best technical school in Israel) and political dept. at Haifa University. His command career started in a tank turret during October War 1937. He commandeered armoured battalion, armoured brigade and tank division. He left the services in 2004. As a chief of staff during Lebanese War in 2006 he commandeered Merkava units.

Today, exploiting impressions. He found there, he works upon most new ideas on tank protection and survival.

Q. How did you found yourself in the Merkava development team?

A. Nearby the end of 2001, I got nominated the CINC of tank forces of Israel. My team was responsible for all Merkava complement, other tanks too.

Because of the health problems Gen. Israel Tal was unable to devote himself fully to Merkava development. The instant solution found by Ministry of Defence was to find someone to replace Gen. Tal in the group of tank development. It was only half of a solution. It has been decided to arrange a committee, led by Gen. Yossi Ben Hanan (ret.) to supervise the two groups in Merkava development – the one that looks after continuous development (tank program administration) and the second in Armoured Forces staff. Owing to my contacts with Gen. Ben Hanan (he was some time my superior – he also was CINC of Tank Forces) and with support of Gen. Tal we decided that tank forces will not remain as since, but will take more active role in the tank development. In this phase of reorganization, the head of TPA – Gen. David Angel – and me, we led the active consulting meetings with Gen. Tal. During this meetings we have obtained so many directions and counsels that we were able to arrange all this into catalogue for Merkava development. I must add, that my technical education helped me much in this demanding tasks, but the rear reason for success in tank development was the friendship and team spirit.

Q. Could you describe for us the main targets in Merkava IV development, and the fundamentals of the vehicle itself?

A. These short and obvious question demand a wide and long introduction to explain not only why we needed a new tank, but also to tell what we expected from the tank in Israel. As cornerstones at the decision of Merkava IV development, there were present two main elements taken from coming challenge. These were:

1. Dramatical change of dangers, caused by development of modern, available combat platforms. And by structure of coming confrontations. Saying simply, the conventional army had to fight the non – military enemy that was equipped with effective destructive arsenal (asymmetric actions).

2. New fighting system that could be absorbed in existing and proven tank design. This is no place to discuss everything challenging the security of my country but it must be said, they are various and me must find adequate means and equipment to fight them. So we must be able to:

a. Protect the country against any form of aggressive active undertaken by potential enemy (e.g. the rocket attack from Iran)

b. Protect the country against surprise attack from our neighbours (they have advantage of numbers, we could see it in 1973 war)

c. To protect the country against terrorist organisations working in neighbourhood or sponsored by them (like Hezbollah or Hamas in Ghaza)

d. To paralyze all enemy actions from Western Shore and directed from that area against Israel

Early in 1980 (after confirming of new Merkava project) we thought, this target has been fulfilled. So, we decided to assure our army more freedom of manoeuvre and keeping of tactical advantage on the land battlefield. The military success and victory in our specifical area (in others, possibly, too but not so decisively) is measured by the area you can control and dominate. This is the core in every near East conflict.

But, from the other side, we had to take into account that current tanks were losing an advantage over asymmetric challenge, they had to cope with. There was an avalanche of new, more efficient weapon’s system directed against us. We understood that most effective means of fighting them are combat teams of light infantry. We analyzed the best methods of fighting such organizations, and we accepted that in first phase we have to isolate and surround the area, to reach a domination through aggressive action of armoured and mechanized formations and only later to keep and clean the area, to use lighter units. This method has been used during Shield Wall operation on Western Shore, conducted between March 29 and May 10 2002. Its target was to strike into Palestinian infrastructure, to stop the bomb attentats. First time after the operation Peace For Galilea in 1982 we used on such a large scale heavy armour and many mechanized reserve units.

One has to understand that because of small number of Israel citizens we are unable to act with units of great numbers of people – especially infantry. In our army we stress the quality not quantity, with the equipment too. One of our principles is to keep overwhelming advantage (technical) of equipment, we use. Tanks, of course, too. So, we explained why mechanized and armoured formations are necessary to obtain freedom of manoeuvre in new type of operations, and this way we come back to history of Merkava IV development.

Tanks, as self- sufficient combat units are designed only in Israel. We assume that the success of their action must be based on complicated and problematic coordination of many supporting forces and formations.

The basic requested ability of tanks of Merkava family in operational radius of 5 km are:

1. 100% certain destroying of any tanks and AVFs of enemy

2. The guaranteed elimination of all strong points of infantry, either direct or behind obstacles (mortars and howitzers)

3. Ability to destroy attack helicopters

4. The readiness to be used as APC

5. Reconnoitring of targets, day and night. An passing of data to other AFVs.

6. Equipping of large stocks of food and water

7. High survival probability in the battlefield

8. High resistance of every chassis element against hits, damages etc. (wheels, rocking arms, dampers, tracks)

Taking into account all strategic assumptions, conditions and self-sufficiency, we Israelis take tank as necessary main operational cornerstone. Such was also with beginnings of Merkava IV. We assumed, it will have all operational properties of Merkava III, but we had to improve its survivability in new dangers of battlefield. As up to now it was not paid enough attention to the combat specifics in urbanized areas or in difficult terrain of South Lebanon.

We started from improving of turret protection, this cost the rise of weight and changes of structure (as more heavy turret requested more efficient revolving mechanism). This, of course, caused more changes-rising weight asked for more power, and this needed more hull space. So, we had to change the design. We found that all this is much more than simple adaptations of Merkava III can cope with.

I would like to turn your attention to some new elements introduced in protection system that improved the survivability of a tank and its crew: the active armour, complicated spaced armour system covering also the turret roof (both passive and ERA), systems of discovering of threats, new design of hull armour, armoured track covers. We have been asked to create new tank of many abilities, the leader that would lead combat groups in combat it different terrain (both urbanized and similar to Lebanon where we had to fight various militias). And we added improved fire control and observation abilities. The optoelectronics, we used, permits reconnoitring identification and tracking of various targets in high resolution on large distance, over 6 km day and 5 km night. We improved the situation by installing two independent sight & control systems. One for commander and another for gunner. We also improved the agility of the tank, that makes it better in the attack. All tanks systems are controlled by one integrated net, connecting all crew places. We also installed Electronic Battle Management System that helps to gather all information about enemy and fast introducing it to sighting system.

Q. Can you describe us the prototype tests of Merkava IV? How long time in months (or years?) it was led to maturity?

A. Merkava tanks are developed with so called “Telescope Method” – every next model emerges from the experience gathered by crews of previous models (say I and II). Every improvement approved by TPA is introduced in all variants, sometimes also older ones, that are out of production. When changes necessary don’t “go” into current version, we build new one. So we came to Merkava IV. It is clear that we work on these same assumptions, improving qualities of the tank gradually, so the time to introduction of new model is relatively short in comparison with other designs. Additionally the synergy typical for Israel helps too-and other designers have not reached it.

• The development team is a part of Ministry of Defence (it is not the private company)
• This same team of specialists controls all the development (there are also about 250 subcontractors)
• The single assembly and production centre with management controlled by GOVT. AdministrationPermanent contact with army that use the product

New model of tank can emerge in about 6 years after decision (to production of first real tank piece) and new APC in about 5 years.

Q. Can you tell us anything about combat christening of Merkava IV?

A. The combat christening of Merkava IV took place during second Lebanon war summer 2006. It was very confused environment. On the beginning we had not a declared war, so armed forces were not used accordingly to doctrine. Up to final parts of this war we kept our tanks away understanding that in ambushes prepared by Hezbollah, tanks will have great losses. Up to change of war conception tanks were used to medevac and food and water supply missions. During one of such clashes near Brint Jbeil we lost one Merkava IV. The come on deep buried IED. It was battalion commander vehicle with 7 soldiers. One of them has been killed, two wounded. Second tank from this battalion has been hit by ATGM in top of turret. The head didn’t penetrated but the tank commander has been killed (brain shock). When General Staff decided to take all Lebanon in wide manoeuvre, Merkavas have been introduced in Eastern Sector nearby Wadi Al-Saluqi. During this action 16 Merkava IV tanks have been hit, 9 tank personnel have been killed.

8 tanks have penetrated armours but none has been burnt out. After evacuation they were rebuilt and used again. In all cases of penetration this was done by tandem warheads of Russian production (Kornet 9M133, Metis-M9K115-2, and spandrel AT-5) in the hands of Hezbollah. We even today feel bitter critics of combat methods used by Israeli Army. Many numerous investigations after the war supported the need of additional armour protection (ERA). But most demanding was rebuilding of system of intensive training, so that they again will be operations ready. The conclusions, we took from Second Lebanon War are clear – lack of defined targets and the reluctance of Northern Command and General Staff to arranging of wide scale offensive have been damaging. The fatal effects of Wadi Al-Saluqi tank battle were also caused by lack of determination and coordination.

Q. Tell us now, please, of Merkava IV and Namer heavy APC in newest operation in Ghaza Zone. Could you tell something about experiences and conclusions from this theatre of operations?

A. The Second Lebanon War has been the turning point in improving process of Israeli Land Forces. We had quickly to cope with two threats

• To find a solution against fire led from hidden positions (mortars rocket launchers)
• To avoid the long range ATGM threat

It would be stupid to introduce not adequately protected APCs to the area saturated with AT armament without some means of protection. We have found that most of our infantry combat platforms (like in other Western countries) is unsuitable for use under such conditions like Lebanon or Ghaza. The temporary means in Ghaza was to use tanks and heavy APCs on tank chassis (Achzarit) that carried infantry and helped her to took the dangerous, urbanised area. The infantry is endangered if you send them in urbanised area on unsuitable vehicles.

The experiences from Second Lebanon War, can be summed up as follows:

1. To use the massed, multidirectional fire assault in order to remove Hamas fighters away – out of reach of their weapons to our forces

2. One has to keep continuous, multidirectional attack of our forces to get and dominate the area

3. One has to assure the total air domination, coordinating destroying of different targets by different forces (Navy including), also with RPVs.

We learned, we have to build well protected AIVs, to be introduced in critical point just as – say – in Ghaza. So we decided to build heavy APCs on tank – Merkava – chassis – the Namer. They got adequate protection also with ERA.

The help to carry the infantry to the assault targets and assure the best possible survivality means. The Namer development has been finished and the production in Israel started (maybe later also in USA). It works in parallel to Merkava IV production. We plan to have in 4 coming years, hundreds of these heavy APCs.

Q. In your opinion, tanks have still a futurity? Could you quote most new solutions helping them to survive on the battlefield?

A. My friends in Israel, like me, have no doubts that combat platforms based on tank experience will be necessary in coming years. I hope, I have explained it sufficiently. Such General conclusion gives, still, no reason to abandon thinking of futurity of armoured forces, and to resign of quoting questions. The main enemy of tank will not be another tank. The tank is threatened by ATGMs and IED plus unconventional means of combat that are already present on the battlefields.

Interviewed – W. Łuczak.